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Abstract. The 2016 US Presidential election highlighted certain negative 
manifestations of Web 3.0 that points to sustained efforts at disruption as a 
political tool and a new kind of arbitrary interference aimed at undermining the 
prevailing culture and traditions of modern democratic nation-states. The 
growing importance of social media and the weaponization of big data and fake 
news signal that new forms of domination will be a significant challenge to 
democratic practices going forward. This paper explores these developments 
through the lens of republicanism and asks if this approach can offer an attractive 
way to address these threats. In particular, I argue that republicanism’s focus on 
minimizing domination through its alternative conception of liberty contains a 
certain resilient form of antipower that serves to counter some of the arbitrary 
interferences that have emerged in the shift from Web 2.0 to 3.0.  
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The plan of this paper is straightforward. First, I briefly sketch out 
the main tenants of modern republican political theory, highlighting 
its alternative conception of liberty. I then explore some of the 
aforementioned disruptive interferences facing modern nation-
states. Finally, I return to the idea of modern republican liberty as 
non-domination arguing that the stress it places on resilience and 
control offers a way forward in combatting arbitrary interference. 
 
I. REPUBLICAN LIBERTY AS NON-DOMINATION 
 
It has been argued that republican liberty as non-domination 
features a resilient form of liberty (Pettit 1997 and 2001; Skinner 
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1997 and 2002). This way of thinking about liberty points to an ideal 
of assurance that liberty as non-domination is entrenched in the 
institutional structure of the republic. Furthermore, because this 
resilience is entrenched in this manner, the thought is that 
republican liberty can respond to the changing needs of the citizenry 
and, combined with properly constituted republican institutions, 
facilitate the active and contestatory nature of republican politics. 
Republican theorists argue that freedom consists neither in the non-
interference of others, as in negative liberty, nor is it equated with 
self-mastery, as in positive liberty. Instead, individuals are free to the 
extent that they are not subject to any interference that arises apart 
from their own arbitrium or will. Seen in this manner, individuals 
are free to the extent that they live under the conditions where they 
count as “a ‘freeman’ rather than a ‘bondsman’, a liber rather than a 
servus” (Pettit 2006, 134 and 2008, 106-8). Thus, for republicans, 
individuals are considered to be at liberty when they are free from 
any interference that is not forced to track their common avowed 
interests. For Pettit (2008, 106-8), republican liberty is defined as the 
absence of alien or alienating control on the part of other persons 
that negatively affects an individual’s freedom of choice. 
An attractive aspect of the republican approach is that it 
identifies arbitrary power as the nemesis of freedom, whether that 
power arises from the state or among the people. An agent (or 
agency) dominates another agent when the first is able to exercise 
arbitrary power over the other (Pettit 1996, 578). Seen in this way, 
republican liberty as non-domination can be thought of as a form 
of antipower, one that is obtained when institutions and practices 
actively eliminate dominating power hierarchies. For Pettit (1996, 
589), antipower represents “a form of control that a person enjoys 
in relation to his own destiny - and such control represents one 
familiar type of power: the power of the agent who can make things 
happen.” Antipower in this sense resiliently serves to protect 
individuals against potential dominators by minimizing the capacity 
of others from exercising domination over them. When seen in this 
manner, modern republican antipower stops domination before it 
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emerges by removing the capability of the dominator to act with 
arbitrary interference. This is a crucial point, especially in light of 
Web 3.0’s new modes and orders of disruption, one to which I will 
come back to in Section III to further explore.  
For republicans, for antipower to be present there must be a 
constitutive relationship between non-domination and the citizenry, 
institutions, laws and values of the state. Lena Halldenius (2010, 12-
3) argues that “republican freedom makes sense only in an 
institutional setting; it is institution-dependent”. Moreover, 
republicans think of freedom as a kind of status, one that is 
recognized by others and receives institutional support, which 
shields or immunizes individuals from arbitrary interference (Pettit 
2006, 133; Honohan 2002, 184). Thus, republican institutional 
design, the rule of law, and the political virtues that support them, 
all point to a more robust form of liberty that seeks to secure citizens 
from arbitrary interference. 
Similarly, Christian List (2006, 218) has argued that the modern 
republican approach has a built-in “rule-of-law” component that 
highlights the definitional relationship between liberty as non-
domination, democracy, the institutional and legal structures that 
support it and the common good. Understood this way, an 
individual is free in the modern republican sense only if he is 
recognized by others as enjoying a kind of status that resiliently 
serves to protect him from any interference that does not track his 
interests and promotes his equal status as a citizen (Laborde and 
Maynor 2008, 9).  
However, at first glance, relying on institutions and on 
constitutionalism may, in the shift from Web 2.0 to 3.0, present 
republicans a significant challenge. Namely, that this shift has 
weakened the very institutions and mechanisms republicans rely on 
to minimize domination. For Cécile Laborde, the modern nation-
state is facing “complex new forms of unchecked arbitrary power” 
that flow across national borders and are exercised by distant and 
usually anonymous agents and agencies against vulnerable 
individuals who have little capacity to counter this kind of arbitrary 
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interference. Moreover, “instead of relationships of cooperation or 
interdependence, which would imply reciprocity and mutual benefit, 
the current international order is marked by one-sided and largely 
coerced domination and dependency” (Laborde 2010, 50).  
What we are left with is an image of seemingly powerless 
individuals who are subjected to real and sustained instances of 
disruptive arbitrary interference without any means of effectively 
countering it. These individuals live at the mercy of others – others 
who do not track their interests and who exercise their power at will 
and with impunity – all without any effective means of fighting back 
and regaining their status as a free person. What this points to is a 
legitimization deficit in certain decision-making processes in 
instances where individuals are exposed to certain actions or 
decisions in which they have no ability to influence through the 
existing networks and norms of democratic participation. It follows, 
then, that republican institutions and constitutional mechanisms 
may have a diminished ability to shield individuals from certain 
sources of domination. In the next section, I want to highlight some 
of these threats in greater detail. 
 
 
II. WEB 3.0 AND THE NEW MODES AND ORDERS OF DISRUPTION 
 
In this section, I want to highlight some of the ways that disruptive 
interferences have impacted the recent US politics. There are at least 
five areas that I believe constitute the most disruptive interferences:  
 
• foreign interference through online mediums 
• social media bots 
• fake news 
• echo chambers and filter bubbles 
• the weaponization of big data 
 
While the points on this list are not exclusive or exhaustive, it is my 
belief that they represent the most disruptive threats from Web 3.0’s 
new modes and orders.  
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By now, many will be familiar with Russian efforts to interfere in 
the 2016 US Presidential election. According to an indictment (USA 
vs. Internet Research Agency LLC et al) issued by a Washington, 
DC grand jury, the Russian government operated a three-year 
scheme, code-named the Translator Project, executed by the 
Internet Research Agency, to “spread distrust toward the candidates 
and the political system in general” (Shane and Mazzetti). A main 
goal of this campaign was to stoke controversy to foment discord 
and disrupt traditional democratic norms by exploiting social 
networks and media. Russian agents posed as American voters on 
social media sites like Twitter, Facebook and Reddit using trolls to 
rile up partisans by spreading false narratives and pitting sides 
against each other (Carabeno 2018). 
Exploiting social networks and stoking controversy to foment 
discord and disrupt traditional democratic norms was perhaps the 
most effective aspect of this campaign. Russian agents posed as 
American voters on social media sites like Twitter, Facebook and 
Reddit spreading false narratives and pitting sides against each other. 
It is estimated that at least 126 million Americans were exposed to 
some aspect of this operation. Using trolls to rile up partisans 
became one of the most common tactics used by them. Planning 
and holding political rallies was another common tactic. The 
indictment, USA vs. Internet Research Agency LLC et al (2018), 
states that on August 16, 2016, a Facebook group known as “Being 
Patriotic” organized twenty rallies that took place simultaneously in 
Florida, including one that featured an imprisoned Hillary Clinton 
impersonator on the back of a flatbed truck (Cerabino 2018).  
The IRC was also responsible for directing swarms of Twitter 
bots to push false narratives and fake news during this election. An 
example of one of the more prominent of these accounts was 
@TEN_GOP. According to the Indictment (2018):  
 
Defendants and their co-conspirators also created and controlled numerous 
Twitter accounts designed to appear as if US persons or groups controlled 
them. For example, the organization created and controlled the Twitter 
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account ‘Tennessee GOP”, which used the handle @TEN_GOP. The 
@TEN_GOP account falsely claimed to be controlled by a US state political 
party. Over time, the @TEN_GOP account attracted more than 100,000 
online followers.  
 
These kinds of activities have continued. For example, in the wake 
of the Parkland school shooting on February 14, 2018, the top 
hashtags were #NRA, #guncontrolnow, #shooting, #teacher 
among others (Griffith 2018). Many of these hashtags were 
promoted by legitimate users focusing on the school shooting and 
the many complex issues surrounding gun control. There were, 
however, thousands of Twitter bots using the tragedy for disruptive 
purposes.  
Twitter bots are artificial intelligence (AI) software-controlled 
accounts that use algorithms to generate content and establish 
connections. In general, these kinds of social bots perform certain 
useful functions like the dissemination of news, publications and the 
coordination of volunteer activities. There are, however, other 
malicious uses of bots such as to “emulate human behavior to 
manufacture fake grassroots political support (Ratkiewicz et al. 
2011), promote terrorist propaganda and recruitment (Berger and 
Morgan 2015; Abokhodair, Yoo, and McDonald 2015; Ferrara et al. 
2016), and manipulate the stock market (Ferrara et al. 2016 and 
Varol et al. 2017, 1). Varol discovered that of, the 300 million 
Twitter users, somewhere in between nine and fifteen per cent were 
bots. Facebook, too, has a problem with fake accounts. According 
to their own data, around 60 million accounts are thought to be fake 
(Confessore et al. 2018). An example of how bots can take fake news 
and push it to the top of the trending charts can be seen in the 
attempt to discredit Emma Gonzales, an outspoken survivor of the 
Parkland school shooting. Along with some of her classmates, 
Gonzales was featured in a Teen Vogue (2018) image ripping up a 
paper gun target like those found in firing ranges. The image that 
went viral had been doctored to show Gonzales ripping up a copy 
of the US Constitution.  
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This brings us to the issue of fake news and the way they have been 
used to tear down both politicians and institutions. Facebook is not 
alone in being the main culprits in the spread and use of fake news. 
Both Google and YouTube have fake news problems that they have 
been forced to address forcefully (Renner 2017). Although the 
spreading of false information is not new, the explosion of online 
media combined with the popularity of social media sharing has 
raised serious questions about the vulnerabilities of the modern 
democratic state. According to a recent report by the Harvard 
University’s Shorenstein Center for Media, Politics and Public 
Policy (Lazer 2018): 
 
Current social media systems provide a fertile ground for the spread of 
misinformation that is particularly dangerous for political debate in a 
democratic society. Social media platforms provide a megaphone to anyone 
who can attract followers. This new power structure enables small numbers 
of individuals, armed with technical, social or political know-how, to distribute 
large volumes of disinformation, or “fake news.” Misinformation on social 
media is particularly potent and dangerous for two reasons: an abundance of 
sources and the creation of echo chambers. 
 
Many users’ social networks seem to have a self-reinforcing function 
where like-minded individuals simply help each other solidify their 
fixed preferences by cutting themselves off from any meaningful 
critique of their own beliefs and values. In other words, individuals 
tend to follow only those whose beliefs are similar to theirs. 
Moreover, many maintain that they do not want to engage in critical 
kinds of exchanges online, but instead use social media to seek out 
and interact with like-minded individuals.  
What is at stake here is the potential for groups polarizing and 
entrenching themselves into factions, something that has long 
troubled political theorists and practitioners from Machiavelli to 
Madison. Members of factions tend to place their own narrow self-
interests above that of the common good and can have a destructive 
effect on the political community (Maynor 2007). If social networks 
simply serve as echo-chambers of this or that point of view, there is 
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a risk that positions and preferences will harden and become more 
entrenched (Adamic and Glance 2005). Moreover, the same 
technology that allows users to access an infinite number of debates 
and news-sources also allows them to ignore and filter out those 
that may be critical of their own viewpoints (Harmon 2004). Often 
referred to as filter-bubbles, a related danger is that the lack of 
conflicting information means that falsehoods are not suitably 
challenged, leading to what Benkler et al. (2017) describe as a lack 
of shared reality, something that may prove dangerous for societies.  
These troubling developments are accompanied by the 
weaponization of information through the harvesting of big data 
and the micro-targeting of social media users. Micro-targeting is a 
strategy that uses demographics and consumer data gained from a 
range of sources including tracking users’ internet browsing history, 
social media activities, shopping habits, etc. The ultimate goal is to 
identify the interests of preferences of like-minded individuals to 
influence their thoughts and actions through both traditional and 
online advertising. Although micro-targeting has long been a 
standard tool used by political campaigns, the shift from Web 2.0 to 
3.0 has seen an increase in the sophistication of coding algorithms 
that has opened up new opportunities to influence and potentially 
manipulate voters.  
A good example of this is the now infamous Cambridge 
Analytica (CA), who were able to covertly obtain personal 
information on somewhere around 50 million Facebook users. 
Although there is some confusion surrounding the extent of their 
influence on the US 2016 election, there are some basic facts known. 
Initially hired to promote the candidacy of Senator Ted Cruz, CA 
worked on behalf of the Trump campaign during the general 
election, once Cruz had dropped out. It is said that they were able 
to covertly obtain personal information through the acquisition of 
data from a researcher who had collected it using a seemingly benign 
personality test app. The goal was, according to Christopher Wylie, 
a data science contractor turned whistleblower, to build an 
algorithm based on the Facebook data to construct a psychological 
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profile that would target voters with personalized political 
advertisements (Greenfield 2018). While it may be impossible to 
know the impact, if any, these kinds of advertisements had, there is 
evidence to suggest that this kind of micro-targeting is especially 
effective with low-information voters, which helped to form the 
base of Trump’s winning effort (Fording and Schram 2017).  
Not surprisingly, as mentioned earlier, there is a thought that 
these kinds of disruptive interferences are one of the many grave 
threats facing the modern democratic nation-state. So what does 
republicanism have to offer in the face of, to borrow a phrase from 
David Remnick, this “stress test of liberal democracy?” In the next 
section, I want to return to an issue that I raised earlier, namely the 




III. THE RESILIENCE OF NON-DOMINATION  
 
Earlier, I argued that republicans understand liberty as non-
domination as a kind of antipower. On the one hand, this approach 
tolerates certain kinds of interference – namely those that are not 
arbitrary and help to constitute it whereas, on the other hand, it 
seeks to eliminate interferences that are arbitrary. For republicans, 
certain interferences that help to secure liberty as non-domination 
such as the rule of law, properly constituted institutions and 
distinctive republican ideals serve to offer a kind of guarantee of 
being free in a particular kind of manner. What this points to is that 
republican liberty as non-domination has a resilient quality to it 
(Pettit 1997, 24). According to Brennan and Hamlin (2001, 47), the 
“idea of resilience is related to the idea of assurance - a resilient 
liberty is one that is assured in the sense that it is not contingent on 
circumstances, but rather is entrenched in the institutional 
structure”. Thus, in this way, republican liberty should be 
understood as a resilient core of protection that allows individuals 
to determine which ends they will pursue within the context of non-
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domination. It does this through two important strategies. The first 
can be found within a polity’s institutions and policies as they aim 
to regulate potential instances of domination through the use of 
protective institutions and policies. The second aims to empower 
individuals by promoting their well-being and capability to enjoy 





The first strategy to promote the kind of resilient antipower 
associated with republican liberty resides within a polity’s 
institutions and policies and aims to regulate potential instances of 
domination through the use of protective institutions and policies. 
Republicans have long stressed the importance of constitutions and 
the rule of law as forms of protective institutions that help keep 
arbitrary power in check. Moreover, republicans also advocate 
aggressively regulating the resources of the powerful by utilizing 
traditional mechanisms like checks and balances; the dispersion of 
power across a range of legislative, administrative, and judicial levels; 
democratic contestation; and active civic engagement (Maynor 2003 
and 2006). And, as mentioned above, it is important to note here 
the important role that democracy plays in republican political 
theory. In minimizing arbitrary interference, democratic 
institutional structures allow individuals to bring their interests out 
into political forums so they can be accounted for and tracked by 
others and the state.  
Importantly, for republicans, what this points to is a specific kind 
of antipower that resides within democratic institutions and 
practices and transforms potentially dominating policies so they are 
not considered alien to the many individuals and groups that make 
up society (Maynor 2010). Moreover, what this also points to is that, 
for republicans, an individual’s liberty is inherently linked to 
governing institutions that necessarily reside within their sphere of 
influence and which they control through democratic practices. To 
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minimize domination, citizens must know these institutions, how 
they work, and be able to engage with them in a positive manner to 
help shape the policies that emerge from them. In other words, it 
seems important that these institutions reside in close proximity to 
the citizenry – they need to be able to see them operate and, 
crucially, easily influence them to help minimize arbitrary 
interference. With respect to Web 3.0’s disruptive interferences, 
there has to be a concerted state effort to force internet companies 
to adhere to certain best practices that increase individuals’ control 
over how their online data is managed and utilized. But individuals, 





The second strategy to promote individuals’ antipower can be seen 
in three advantages they enjoy when they are free from domination 
that is likely to boost their control over who or what interferes with 
them (Maynor 2003, 43-8). To be sure, in each of these there is an 
important individual responsibility that emerges. The first is that 
individuals are secured from any anxiety or uncertainty they may 
experience from those who seek to interfere arbitrarily with them. 
Maximizing freedom as non-domination will lower the degree to 
which individuals are subject to arbitrary interference and, because 
the interference that they experience tracks their interests and 
opinions, uncertainty and anxiety are reduced (Pettit 1997, 85). The 
second advantage is that it reduces the degree to which individuals 
have to be prepared to defend themselves against arbitrary 
interference. It follows, then, that the degree that individuals have 
to plan strategically to cope with arbitrary interference is reduced 
the more non-domination is maximized. In many instances, like 
those that may occur online, individuals lose this battle with 
arbitrary interference. However, increasing the range of options 
open to individuals to control their online data and presence will 
likely reduce their efforts to protect themselves from the arbitrary 
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interference of others. Finally, individuals who experience a 
decrease in their vulnerability to arbitrary interference may also 
experience subjective and inter-subjective benefits since they will be 
more or less on equal footing with others. This benefits both the 
way they view others and the way in which they view themselves. 
Measures like reducing the anonymity of many internet users may 
help level the playing field so that others can look at each other in 
the eye.  
 The upshot from both the institutional and individual forms of 
antipower is that agents retain a fair degree of control over what 
interferes with them and whether or not that interference is 
arbitrary. This is the key to resilience – the more control individuals 
have the more resilient their liberty is, the less control they have, the 
more their liberty is at risk. The key, then, to addressing Web 3.0’s 






It is my contention that the most effective way to combat arbitrary 
interference is to vest republican liberty as non-domination within 
the current governmental technology of the modern democratic 
state. As Kymlicka (2001) has pointed out, at the moment the “only 
forum in which genuine democracy occurs is within national 
boundaries”. It follows, then, as the first line of defence against the 
disruptive interferences of Web 3.0, a nation-state’s political 
institutions and ideals should reflect republican priorities so that 
citizens have more power and control. Nation-states are going to 
have to better guard themselves against outside meddling through 
online mediums. They are going to have to regulate social media 
companies to ensure that users data is secured and not being used 
for malicious purposes; and they are going to have to work to 
develop and promote critical thinking and information literacy. As 
a second line of defence, social media companies have a role to play 
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addressing these kinds of interferences. They are going to have to 
make it easier for users to manage their personal data; they are going 
to have to be more transparent in how they use this data; they are 
going to have to do a better job working to identify and weed out 
social bots; and they are going to have to work harder to filter out 
fake news from their networks. Finally, as a third line of defence, 
individuals are going to have to up their game, too. They are going 
to have to work to seize control of their online data; they are going 
to have to do a better job critically engaging with online content; 
they are going to have to reduce their reliance on anonymity; and 
they are going to have to interact on social media in a non-
dominating manner. For modern republicans, it comes down to 
control. The more control over interference an agent has, the less 
arbitrary these interferences are. So with respect to Web 3.0’s 
disruptive interferences, the more control individuals have over 
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